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(Frankfurt, Germany).

Europe’s evolving constitution’
‘
The following essay is an updated excerpt based on the keynote address
the author delivered at the ninth International Conference of the
European Union Studies Association last year in Austin,Texas, at which
he was awarded EUSA’s Lifetime Contribution to the Field Prize. Stein
was the ﬁrst lawyer to receive the prize, which had been awarded three
times previously.The complete address appears in the summer 2005 issue
of EUSA Review, Vol. 18, No. 3.

by Eric Stein
Eric Stein

Let me start with a quotation the source of which you may or
may not recognize.
“[There is a form of society], in which several states are fused
into one with regard to certain common interests, although
they remain distinct, or only confederate, with regard to all
other concerns. In this case the central power acts directly upon
the governed, whom it rules and judges in the same manner as
a national government, but in a more limited circle. Evidently,
this is [not] a federal government, but an incomplete national
government, which is neither exactly national nor exactly
federal but the new word which ought to express this novel
thing does not exist.”
While you contemplate the likely author, let me read one
more passage from the same sources: “The human understanding more easily invents new things than new words,
and we are hence constrained to employ many improper and
inadequate expressions.”
It may come as a surprise to you—as it has to me—that the
author is none other than the 19th century French aristocratic
traveler, Alexis de Tocqueville, describing one of the categories
of his model of composite states, and—what is even more
astounding—his prophesy of the predicament which we have
been facing in dealing with European integration. This is what
Professor Neil MacCormick has said about the European
Community: “Here we have not merely a new legal system, but
maybe even a new kind of legal system. . . . We have remained,
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as it were, bewitched with the paradigm of the state and
its law. . . .” We are “juristic pre-Darwinians,” unwilling to
welcome a new species, any “novel interlopers into our judicial
consciousness.” In fact, we still insist on translating solutions
developed within the state to the novel phenomenon and using
state nomenclature. This, in a sense is a natural tendency since
the state is, so to speak, the only show in town if one looks for a
model, and international law is of little help.
I shall mention some more or less egregious examples of the
“translation” conundrum. Take the world “demos.” Demos, I am
told by my colleague in classics, meant anywhere from 6,000
to 13,000 Athenians, free and male, who met in an assembly
(Ekklesia), ﬁrst in the Agora and later in the place with the
intriguing name Pnyz. What, please tell me, has this picture
to do with the situation of the peoples in the European Union
member states or with the non-existent European people? Yet
demos and demoi have become embedded in the vocabulary of
EU scholarship.
Another—and perhaps more serious example—is the term
“identity.” National identity in the ethnic-cultural-historicterritorial sense is—sociologists tell me—a well established
category. But, the so-called “European identity,” to the extent
that it exists today, is an entirely different cup of tea, and we
should have another name for it. If nothing else, the babble
of 20 languages and the prospect of Turkey’s admission to the
Union makes a mockery of any reliance on ethnicity or history.

In an interesting research project, the British sociologist
Yasemin Soysal examined how Europe is portrayed in school
books and debates about school curricula in the United
Kingdom, Germany, and France, and her conclusion illuminates
the problem. She points out that what she calls European
identity differs considerably from the national type of identity
which is deeply rooted in history, cultures, or territories. She
found that history schoolbooks may glorify Europe’s Roman,
Catholic, or even Greek origins as remarkable European
achievements; but these origins are less and less offered within
a religious or ethnic narrative, and increasingly in the more
abstract form of the universal principles they contain; what
holds Europe together, in schoolbooks, she concludes, is a set of
civic ideals and universalistic principles.
I would agree that these ideals and principles, along with
common expectations, European Union law, Walter Hallstein’s
“Rechtsgemeinschaft,” and the drafting of an EU constitution,
provide the foundation for an evolving identiﬁcation with
“Europe.” In other words they provide the foundation for a
European identity, if I must use the term, in the absence of a
better word for a new phenomenon.
My third example of the translation problem is applying
the “democracy-accountability” concept to Union institutions.
Let me just mention the approach taken in the recent draft
constitution; that document incorporates the present form
of the so-called dual accountability, that is the accountability
of ministers in the European Council to national parliaments
and the European Commission accountability to the European
parliament elected by the peoples in the individual member
states. The accountability of ministers to their parliaments
remains illusory in most member states, but the constitution
would have sought to increase the role of the European parliament as a means of improving accountability.
In addition, however, the constitution text included three
other innovations: ﬁrst, a “participatory model,” deﬁned as
a structured, systematic dialogue between the institutions
and the civil society. A spokesman for civil society argued
that this could either be a potential “milestone” for a change
in decision making, or just “a blast of hot air” ending again in
mere consultation. Professor Jo Shaw shared the latter skeptical

view. According to the second innovation, the national parliaments would be given an opportunity to give their opinion on
proposed Union legislation, clearly an effort to advance the
subsidiarity principle. And ﬁnally, an elaborate provision for
a popular initiative aimed at inducing the commission to act
where it has failed to act.
Lastly, in this litany of translation troubles, are the terms
“constitution” and “constitutionalizing.” The use or misuse of
these concepts is startling. I have seen references to Constitutio
Westphalica and a Westphalian constitutional moment. But let
me go back just to the aftermath of World War II—halcyon
days of international institution building. The basic documents
of international organizations founded at the time, such as
the International Labor Organization and the World Health
Organization are named “Constitutions.” Allow me to mention
a talk I gave back in 1955—just half a century ago—while I was
on the staff of the State Department Bureau of United Nations.
I questioned the use of the term “constitutional” with
reference to the United Nations. The U.N.—I said—was a
loose association of sovereign states in a world fundamentally
dominated by power considerations and we could not analyze
its problems in terms of an orderly community, operating under
a rule of law. Today, I would suggest a similar caution in the
current academic debate about “constitutionalizing” the World
Trade Organization.
The same year, in 1955, I was part of a working group
of ofﬁcials, facing a blank sheet of paper, with a mandate to
make a ﬁrst draft of a basic document for a new international
organization which was to deal with the novel nuclear energy
problems. This was at the time when the vision of a new, postwar world order had begun to fade. I don’t remember which
one of us in the working group had the good sense of calling
the new creature modestly “an agency” and its basic document a
“statute” rather than “a constitution.” The International Atomic
Energy Agency was eventually established in Vienna and it has
emerged as an important player in the nuclear nonproliferation
campaign.
And this brings us chronologically to the birth of the judicial
“constitutionalization” saga in European integration. It is, to
add a touch of drama (with a grain of salt) a story of a dark
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conspiracy and outrageous collusion, engineered by a coven
of judges and lawyers against unsuspecting governments. It
started, you will recall, with a trivial controversy over import
duties—the notorious VanGend en Loos case—which the
Dutch court referred to the European Court.
In 1962-63 I was spending some months in Brussels with the
legal service of the commission at the invitation of its director
general, the brilliant and inﬂuential Michel Gaudet, formerly of
the Conseil d’Etat. I was able to sit in the meeting of the legal
service lawyers that was to work out a formal opinion of the
commission in the VanGend case for submission to the Court
of Justice. In the fascinating debate, advocates of the “constitutional” approach argued with the traditional internationalists. I
must confess that—looking at the text of the treaty—I did not
see an alternative to the internationalist position. In the end,
led by the director general, the “constitutionalists” prevailed.
The conclusion, written in the commission brief and accepted
by the court, was that it was the Court of Justice, not the
national court, that decides whether a Community treaty
provision had a direct effect in the legal orders of the member
states and the court would apply the most liberal criteria of
interpretation: the spirit, general scheme, and wording. In the
court’s vision, the Community treaty is not an ordinary treaty.
The Community constitutes a new legal order “for the beneﬁt
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights within
limited ﬁelds, and the subjects of which comprise not only
member states but also their nationals and that imposes obligations upon, and confers rights upon individuals as part of their
legal heritage.”
I do not know which one of the judges on the European
Court was the principal co-conspirator with Gaudet-cabal. But
at any event, it is the commission rather than the court that
deserves the credit (or the blame) for the basic idea of “constitutionalizing” the EC Treaty, a move designed to replace the
international law canon with public law concepts—all this on
the basis of rather scant provisions of the Community treaty.
The result, as evidenced by subsequent European Court
decisions, has been to turn the broad Community treaty obligations addressed to governments and the principles which were
to be implemented by the political institutions, into directly
effective provisions enforceable by interested individuals. The
“vigilance of the individuals,” as the Court put it, along with
the reduction of the unanimity requirement in the council have
made the common and the single markets a reality.
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The second act in the constitutionalization drama was the
equally well known Costa v. E.N.E.L. case. It originated in an
obvious collusion between a Milan justice of the peace and
Costa, a local attorney, who hated the nationalization of the
public utility in his city. Costa sued to question the payee of
his monthly electric bill and the justice of peace managed to
push the case before the Italian Constitutional court and the
European Court of Justice. The European court seized this
opportunity, passed up in VanGend, to establish the general
principle of “precedence” of Community law over national law
and it claimed the last word in any conﬂict between the two
legal orders. So, the broadly deﬁned direct effect of Community
law in the national legal orders, the principles of supremacy,
preemption, and implied powers and the crucial case law on
foreign affairs powers—along with the expansion of the unique
system of judicial review and enforcement of Community
law—have become the foundation of the “supranational” or
proto-federal legal order, so aptly envisaged by de Tocqueville.
On this foundation the court has built further constitutional-type general principles, such as a broad deﬁnition of
European citizenship and the protection of basic human rights
of individuals against acts of Community institutions. The court
has fashioned its own human rights doctrine from the constitutional traditions of the member states and from the European
Convention on Fundamental Rights. Incidentally, the court’s
solicitude for individual rights is in a stark contrast with its
persistently restrictive interpretation of the individual’s direct
access to the court. This widely criticized interpretation was to
be partly “overruled” in the draft constitution.
In an expansive mood, the court called the Community
treaty a “constitutional charter,” and it tended to construe the
Community powers—and its own jurisdiction—quite broadly
in the early years when the Community legislation was scarce
and there was a need to ﬁll in the gap by judge-made law. The
court was criticized on that score. There is some evidence that
as Community legislation multiplied, the court has inclined
toward a less expansive deﬁnition of Community powers in
both the internal and external spheres of its activities; but this
assessment is contradicted for instance by the court’s more
recent bold interpretations of gender equality. Also, the court
continued to ﬁll in gaps in the treaty system, for example by the
path-breaking holding on member state liability for damages
caused to individuals by member state breach of Community
law, and the liberal use of the concept of “cohesion,” and of

the very general treaty provision calling for cooperation in the
Community. The court’s jurisdiction has been extended along
with the competences of the Union by successive amendments
of the constituent treaties and it would have been further
expanded in the constitution for Europe. It is too early to
estimate the impact of the principle of subsidarity, but it is
interesting that only in October 2000, for the ﬁrst time in its
history, the court arguably struck down a Community law for
lack of Community competence.
So much for the constitutionalizing process which appeared
to reach its climax in the drafting of the treaty extablishing
a constitution for Europe. This is what the president of the
European Parliament, Josep Borrell Fontelles, had to say about
the magic of the word “Constitution” at the signing of the
document in Rome in October 2004:
“The word ‘Constitution’ . . . carried political and symbolic
weight. We should stand by our choice of this word, as we
Europeans know how signiﬁcant it is. In the past, the word
‘Constitution’ has been a point of departure when dictatorships
have fallen. It has helped to bring a new dawn of democracy to
Poland, to France, and to my own country, Spain, not so very
long ago.”
This is a telling explanation why the Europeans, having
created “a new thing” in de Tocqueville’s words, refuse to ﬁnd a
truly new name for it even though it has features incompatible
with the standard pattern of a national constitution. As a treaty,
it had to be ratiﬁed by all member states through national treaty
making processes, and it provided for a right to withdraw from
membership, and in its Part III, it dealt in massive detail with
policies and voting formulae. But the ﬁrst and second parts have
all the trappings of a national basic law. The ofﬁcial title, “Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe,” clearly distinguishes
between the treaty as a form and constitution as a substance
(Lenaerts). At the end of the day, the European Council of
Heads of State and Government recognized the inherent
ambiguity and spoke of a “Constitutional Treaty.”
At any rate, the constitution seemed to represent a new
phase in the half-a-century integration process which has been
marked by a persistent tugging, with the connivance of the
hesitant governments, at the umbilical cord that ties the new
creature to the international law “Grundnorm.”
In concluding, I shall take the liberty to lapse again into a bit
of personal musing. There is in all of us a need for a vision that
would help us “escape the two-dimensional, stale image of the

world.” For me, it was the ﬁrst idea of the new post-war international order centered on the United Nations. As I mentioned
earlier, I worked in the State Department Bureau of United
Nations (later signiﬁcantly renamed the Bureau of International
Organization). I started there in 1946. By the early 1950s, I
became disillusioned with the unfulﬁlled vision of the UN. At
the same time, dispatches passing over my desk reported about
the novel, strange structure rising in Luxembourg. There is in
all of us—as Dr. Freud tells us—a longing for returning to
the locale and dreams of our childhood. To see my old Europe
attempting to shed its old ways for a new art of governance was
an appealing prospect.
Clearly, these thoughts and feelings have been at the foundation of my positive attitude toward European integration
for more than half a century. Professor Trevor Hartley, who
emphatically rejects the constitutionalist theory, has written
that I apparently was the ﬁrst to put that theory forward.Yet
it was the court itself that ﬁrst enunciated the theory in its
VanGend and Costa opinions. The basic concept has been elaborated by scores of scholars, most recently by Professor Daniel
Halberstam [of the University of Michigan Law School] in his
captivating theory of “recalibration” of the position in the Union
of individuals as citizens, consumers, ofﬁcials, judges.
There has been, needless to say, articulate opposition to
such theories by realists, neo-functionalists, and intergovernmentalists of different hues. Clearly, the Union, an evolving
creature with an ambition for a self-referential basis, does not
ﬁt readily into the crystalline, positivist, anti-constitutionalist
world. I readily confess my membership in the constitutionalist
club—but with an important caveat. I expect that the Union
will become a premier player in the world arena, but I have
consistently disagreed with the idea of some “constitutionalists” that the Union will or should or could become ultimately
a centralized federation, a “superstate.” [New York University
Law] Professor J.H.H. Weiler has made the case against that
goal more forcefully than I could. He points to the negative,
exclusionary features of such a form, to the absence of a truly
constitutional foundation and to the pervasive differences
between the peoples of the member states I mentioned earlier.
As of September 2006, 15 of the 25 member states have
ratiﬁed the Treaty Constitution; it was defeated in the popular
referenda in France and The Netherlands and its future is
uncertain.
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